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Physical-Layer Security over Non-Small Scale Fading Channels 
Gaofeng Pan, Chaoqing Tang, Xv Zhang, Tingting Li, Ying Weng, Yunfei Chen 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for performance analysis of 
secure communications over non-small scale fading channels. Considering the three different 
cases where the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent/correlated log-normal 
fading, or independent composite fading, we study secrecy capacity and secrecy outage (including 
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and secure outage probability), respectively. The 
approximated closed-form expressions for secrecy capacity, the probability of non-zero secrecy 
capacity, and secure outage probability have been derived for these three different types of 
non-small fading channels, respectively. Finally, the accuracy of our performance analysis is 
verified by simulation results. 
 
Keywords: Secure capacity, the probability of non-zero secrecy, secure outage probability, 
log-normal fading, composite fading. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, securing the communication over the wireless channels at the physical layer has 
attracted considerableattention from researchers due to the inherent openness of  
communications over wireless channels offerring a shared medium, particularly making it 
vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. 
Traditionally, security was regarded as an independent issue beyond the physical layer scale, 
and was well studied and addressed through designing and implementing some cryptographic 
algorithms (e.g., the widely-used RSA and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)). However,all 
these works were carried on the premise ofholding error-free links in the physical layer. In 
wireless scenarios, it is expensive to distribute and manage the secret key, and further vulnerable 
to attacks, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium [1]. Thus, researchers turn to 
physical layer security, and try to provide secure data transmission by exploiting the 
characteristics of wireless channels. 
  The eavesdropping attack was first studied by Wyner in [2] where a single-user secure 
communication setting was considered: a source node (Alice) wished to transmit confidential 
information to a legitimate destination node (Bob) and keep eavesdropper (Eve) as ignorant of the 
information as possible, as shown in Fig. 1. While a discrete memoryless wiretap channel was 
adopted, the level of ignorance at Evewas measured by its equivocation, and the capacity 
-equivocation region was characterized at the same time. Csiszar and Korner [3] extended 
Wyner’s work to general broadcast channels with confidential messages. Leung-Yan-Cheong and 
Hellman [4] extendedWyner’s result to the Gaussian wiretap channel, and found that the secrecy 
capacity is the difference between the capacities of the main and the eavesdropper channels. Then 
the performance measure of interest in wireless secure communications is to find out the secrecy 
capacity, which is the largest achievable communication rate from the source to the destination 
while the eavesdropper obtains no information. 
Single-antenna wiretap channels were studied in [5-13]. Quasistatic fading channel  was 
considered  while the channel state information (CSI) of the main and the eavesdropper channels  
was not available at the source, and an alternative definition of outage probability was presented 
in the view of time, i.e., secure communications could be guaranteed for the fraction of time when 
the main channel was stronger than the eavesdropper channel [5-7]. Gopala et al. [8] addressed 
the ergodic secrecy capacity of fading channels, and described an optimal power allocation and a 
transmission strategy to let messages be transmitted opportunistically while the condition of the 
main channel instantaneously outperformed that of the eavesdropper channel. Therefore, by 
making use of the opportunistic transmission in this way, a positive secrecy capacity might be 
achieved even when the main channel was noisier. Concurrently and independently, some similar 
results were given in [9] where the secrecy capacity was further investigated over the fading 
broadcast channel. Khisti et al. [10] extended the work in [3] to the scenario where multiple 
legitimate receivers existed over the fading channel, and discussed the secrecy capacity in terms 
of outage probability in the delay limited case. 
Multiple-antenna wiretap channels have been studied recently in [11-17]. Liu and Shamai 
analyzed the secrecy capacity of the 2-2-1 Gaussian Multi-input multi-output (MIMO) wiretap 
channel consisting of a transmitter and a receiver with two antennas each, and an eavesdropper 
with a single antenna, and developed a tight upper bound of the secrecy capacity that met the 
proposed achievable secrecy rate. Khistiand Wornell [13, 14] took account of the Gaussian MIMO 
wiretap channel to compute the secrecy capacity by exploiting the result in [3], and identified the 
necessary auxiliary random variables. Furthermore, they maximized the secrecy capacity for 
MIMO channel through forming a nonconvex problem. Oggier and Hassibi [15] calculated the 
perfect secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna MIMO broadcast channel where the number of 
antennas was arbitrary for both the transmitter and the two receivers. The secrecy capacity region 
of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel was discussed in [16]. Considering the practical 
scenario that no CSI was available at the transmitters, Yang et al. [17] investigated the secrecy 
performance of MIMO over Nakagami-m fading channels while transmit antenna selection was 
adopted. Closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the exact 
secrecy outage probability were derived, based on which the ε-outage secrecy capacity was 
characterized. 
All the above works assumed that the main channel was independent of the eavesdropper 
channel. In the case of correlated fading channels, Jeon et al. [18] dealt with the asymptotic 
behavior of the secrecy capacity in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime and found that the 
secrecy capacity converged to an upper-bound while the ergodic capacity of fading channels  
grew logarithmically with SNR in general. Further, both the average secrecy capacity and the 
outage probability of secure communications over correlated Rayleigh fading channels were 
studied in [19]. 
 Obviously, we can find that all the aforementioned works are limited to Gaussian channels [4], 
[11-16] or small-scale fading channels, e.g. independent/correlated Rayleigh fading channels 
[5-10], [18-19]and Nakagami-m fading channels [17].  
In practical wireless environment, amplitude variation of a received radio signal can be 
modeled as a product of path loss and fading [20]. Several models exist for characterizing path 
loss, including the variants of Okumura–Hata and Walfisch–Ikegami formulas [21]. Fading may 
be either due to multipath propagation, referred to as small-scale multipath fading, or due to the 
shadowing from obstacles affecting the wave propagation, usually referred to as shadow fading. 
Multipath fading arises from the constructive and destructive combination of randomly delayed, 
reflected, scattered and diffracted signal components while shadowing affects the link quality by 
slow variation of the mean level. Some statistical models have been proposed and well adopted to 
depict the effect of small-scale fading on wireless communications, e.g., Rayleigh, Rice, and 
Nagakami-m.  
In addition to small-scale multipath fading, the quality of the received signals may also be 
affected by slow variations of the mean signal level due to shadowing from various obstacles in 
the propagation path. The lognormal distribution is often appropriately used to describe and 
model statistics of the path gain in midscale fading environments caused by shadowing in outdoor 
environments. More recently, researchers have approved that the small-scale fading of indoor 
ultra wideband channels can also be well captured by the log-normal distribution [22]. 
 So far, there has been few works on secure communications over log-normal fading channels 
[23, 24]. Liu [23] investigated the information theoretic secrecy for the independent log-normal 
fading channel, and derived the closed-form expressions of the probability of strictly positive 
secrecy capacity for two types of systems with single eavesdropper and double eavesdroppers, 
respectively. Zahurul and Ratnarajah [24] studied secrecy capacity for the log-normal fading 
channel where the main channel was correlated with the eavesdropper channel, and proposed the 
closed-form analytical expression for the upper bound of secrecy capacity while an optimal power 
allocation at the transmitter was found to achieve the secrecy capacity. 
Furthermore, multipath fading and shadowing occur simultaneously in many cases for 
communication systems with low mobility or stationary users and certain land-mobile satellite 
systems.This composite fading environment consists of multipath fading superimposed by 
log-normal shadowing. To the best of our knowledge, till now, there is no work related to the 
outage behavior of secure communications in non-small fading environment, namely, over 
impendent/correlated log-normal channels or composite fading channels. 
Motivated by the above observations, we propose a comprehensive framework for performance 
analysis of secure communications over non-small scale fading channels, including independent/ 
correlated log-normal fading channels, and independent composite fading channels. The main 
contributions of our work are listed in terms of performance indices as follows: 
(1) Secure Capacity 
a. Differing from the work in [23], we study secrecy capacity over independent 
log-normal fading channels by employingan approximation method to calculate the 
expectation of a normally distributed variable's real function, which leads to an 
approximated analytical expression with low computational complexity as shown in 
Section 3.1; 
b. We propose the closed-form expression for the secure capacity over correlated 
log-normal channels; 
c. We study the secure capacity through approximating the generalized-K distribution 
probability density function (pdf) by a log-normal distribution. 
(2) Secrecy Outage  
a. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is investigated over independent/ 
correlated log-normal fading channels and composite fading channels, respectively. 
Furthermore, the approximated closed-form expressions are also derived for these 
three different types of fading channels, respectively; 
b. The secure outage probability is investigated over independent/correlated log-normal 
fading channels and composite fading channels, respectively. Furthermore, the 
approximated closed-form expressions are also derived for these three different types 
of fading channels, respectively. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system and signal 
models considered in our work. We propose the secrecy capacity analysis for the considered three 
different non-small fading channels in Section III. The secrecy outage analysis is carried out in 
Section IV. In Section V numerical and simulation results are presented and discussed. Finally, we 
conclude the paper with some remarks in Section VI. 
 
2. System and signal models 
 
Fig. 1. System model 
Suppose that the source S sends a message to the legitimate receiver Dover the main channel 
while the eavesdropper E attempts to decode this message from its received signal through the 
eavesdropper channel, as shown in Fig. 1. In this paper, we consider the cases where the main and 
eavesdropper channels experience independent/correlated log-normal fading or independent 
composite fading. (The correlated fading could happen if E is closely located to D). We assume 
that both channels experience the ergodic block fading where channel coefficients remain 
constants during a block period and vary independently across blocks.Furthermore, we also 
assume that the full CSI of both the main and eavesdropper channels is available at S. 
The received signals at D and E are given respectively by 
tD D Dy P h x n                   (1-a) 
tE E Ey P h x n                   (1-b) 
where tP  represents the fixed average transmit power, and Dh and Eh are complex channel gains 
from S to D (main channel) and E (eavesdropper channel), respectively, and Dn and En are 
independent complex Gaussian noises with zero-mean and unit-variances. 
The instantaneous SNRs of the received signals at D and E can be given as 
2
tD DP h   and
2
tE EP h  , respectively. Thus, according to [3], the instantaneous secrecy capacity is defined as 
      , max ln 1 ln 1 ,0s D E D EC                   (2) 
where  ln 1 D and  ln 1 E are the capacity of the main and channel eavesdropper channels, 
respectively. Then the average secrecy capacity can be given by [3] 
       
0 0
, , , ,s D E s D E s D E D E D EC E C C f d d         
 
            (3) 
where  ,D Ef   is the joint pdf. 
 
3. Secrecy capacity analysis over non-small scale fading channels 
In this section, we present the analysis on the average secrecy capacity over three different types 
of non-small scale fading channels: independent/correlated log-normal fading channels, and 
independent composite fading channel. 
 
3.1 Independent log-normal fading 
Assume that the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent log-normal fading, 
namely 
2
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where i and i  are the mean and variance for ih ’s natural logarithm, respectively. 
  Therefore, according to the prosperities of log-normal distribution, we have the instantaneous 
SNRs of the received signals at D and E, D and E , obey log-normal distribution, that is 
 2~ log , ,     { ,  }
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where t2 lni i P   , and
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As the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent log-normal fading, using Eq. 
(5) in Eq. (3), we have 
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Let ln Dy  , we can rewrite  'D DC  as follows 
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Some existed works have proved that log-normal behavior is difficult to deal with [25-28].In 
this work, we adopt the efficient tool proposed by Holtzmanin [29] to deal with Eq. (7). Taking 
Eq. (5-7) in [29],we have 
If  x is a real function of x, a normally distributed variable with mean x  and variance
2
x , 
namely,  2,x xx N   , then, the expectation of  x can be approximated in terms of three mass 
points located at x , 3x x  and 3x x  , as follows 
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Thus, making use of Eq. (8), we can obtain the approximation for  'D DC  as follows 
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  Similarly to the derivation of  'D DC  , we can have 
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Then substituting Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) into Eq. (6), the average secrecy capacity can be 
obtained as follows 
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3.2 Correlated log-normal fading 
Assume that the main and eavesdropper channels experience correlated log-normal fading, 
which typically occurs in propagation under shadowing and antenna diversity systems, where 
correlation of the lognormal fading gains is due to bulk geometrical and electromagnetic 
propagation characteristics experienced by differing propagation paths [30-32]. 
As suggested by [33], a joint log-normal pdf of D and E can be given by  
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where ρ is the correlation coefficient. When 0  , the two diversity paths are uncorrelated. When 
positive correlation exists (i.e., 0 1  ), if one diversity path is strong, it is likely that the other 
diversity path is also strong, and vice versa. When negative correlation exists (i.e., 1 0   ), if 
one diversity path is weak, it is likely that the other diversity path is strong, and vice versa. 
  Using Eq. (12) in Eq. (3), we have 
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After some manipulations, we have 
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Similarly, we have 
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Similarly to the derivation of  'D DC  in the above subsection, we can have 
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3.3 Independent composite fading channels 
While the receiver is subject to the composite multipath/shadowed signal, wireless channels are 
commonly modeled as a mixture of multipath fading and shadowing, which is a general case for 
communication systems with low mobility or stationary users [34, 35]. This model is also 
encountered in certain land-mobile satellite systems (see [36] and the references therein). 
Assume the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent fading, and the 
Generalized-K channel models are adopted to study the secrecy capacity in composite fading 
environments. As suggested by [37], we have the pdf of the output SNR as 
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Where im and in  are the shaping parameters of the distribution of i channel, with i im n   and
1i im n    , and  K  is the modified Bessel function of order α [41, Eq.( 8.407/1)]. In 
Eq.(17), 
4 i i
i
l n
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
 where i  is the average SNR. In general, the parameter m is a positive real 
number. In our analysis, assume that m is an integer, and no condition is imposed on k so it can 
take arbitrary positive real values. An important special case falls under the assumption that m = 1, 
which corresponds to the K-distribution. 
For arbitrary α and β, the ergodic capacity of Generalized-K channels was studied and 
presented in terms of Meijer-G functions in [38]. Since the evaluation of Meijer-G functions can 
be sometimes laborious, our work proposes an alternative approach to derive the closed-form 
expressions of the average secrecy capacity over Generalized-K channels.  
Denoting  ,i i ik G ( { , } i D E ) as a Gamma distributed random variable with a shape 
parameter ik and a scale parameter i , the pdf of i is given as 
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where    1
0
exp    for 0xx t t dt x

    . 
  As indicated in [39], when applying the first and second moment matching to approximate the 
generalized-K distribution by a Gamma distribution, the shapeand scale parameters in Eq. (18) 
can be rewritten as 
 i iAF    , max0 AF AF  , 0 AF   (19-a) 
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where AF is the amount of fading and
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m n m n
   , maxAF is finite and the upper bound 
of AF. i is the mean of the received local power over i channel, and is the adjustment factor. In 
practical the relevant range of   is  8,8 , and 0 AF   . Furthermore, can be computed 
using a numerical measure of the difference between the approximated and the approximating pdf 
(cdf) [39]. 
 Therefore, the average secrecy capacity over Generalized-K channels can be written as 
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A gamma approximation of log-normal distribution pdf was proposed in [40]. Herein, we 
reverse using this approach to obtain E1 and E2. Eq. (18) can be approximated by the following 
log-normal distribution 
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where
i and i  are the mean and variance for i ’s natural logarithm, respectively, which can be 
written as  
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Then substituting Eq. (21) into E1, we obtain 
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By using Eq. (8), we finally obtain 
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Similarly, we obtain 
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By using Eqs. 9.121.6and 7.522.5 in [41], we obtain one expression of 3E , i.e., 
 3 3 1 1,1,1;2; , 0E E E E EE k F k            (26) 
where q pF is the generalized hypergeometric series (Eq. 9.14.1) in [41]. 
Then, the average secrecy capacity over Generalized-K channels can also be obtained by 
substituting Eqs. (24), (25) and (26) into Eq. (20). 
 
4. Secrecy outage analysis over non-small scale fading channels 
In this section, we carry out the analysis on secrecy outage performance over three different 
types of non-small scale fading channels: independent/ correlated log-normal fading channels, 
and independent composite fading channel. 
 
4.1 Independent log-normal fading 
As the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent log-normal fading, the 
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is given by 
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  is the Gaussian Q-function. 
By using Eq. (8), we have 
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(28) 
 
In this work, we define the secure outage probability as 
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where thC ( 0thC  ) is the target secrecy capacity threshold, and  exp thC  . 
 
As the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent log-normal fading, the secure 
outage probability  Prout thC is given by 
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By using Eq. (8), we have 
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where     ln exp 1x x     . 
 
4.2 Correlated log-normal fading 
As the main and eavesdropper channels experience correlated log-normal fading, similarly to 
the above subsection, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity can be given by 
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where  erf x is the error function, which is defined as    2
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It is obvious that  12 0,2x N . Then, by using Eq. (8), we obtain 
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Similarly to the above subsection, we can present the secure outage probability  Prout thC over 
correlated log-normal fading channels as 
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where thC ( 0thC  ) is the target secrecy capacity threshold, and  exp thC  . 
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By using Eq. (8), we can have 
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4.3 Independent composite fading channels 
 
Assume that the main and eavesdropper channels experience independent composite fading, 
similarly to the above subsection 4.1 and by using Eq. (17), the probability of non-zero secrecy 
capacity can beapproximated as 
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By using Eq. (6.455-2) in [41], we obtain the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as 
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Similarly to subsection 4.2, we present the secure outage probability  Prout thC over 
independent composite fading channels as 
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To obtain a closed-form expression for Eq. (40), we reverse what we have done in Section 3.3, 
that is, by adopting a log-normal approximation of gamma pdf, then we have  
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By using Eq. (8), we finally obtain the approximation for the secure outage probabilityover 
independent composite fading channels as 
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5. Numerical results and discussion 
Here, we compare simulation and analysis results for the secrecy capacity and secrecy outage 
(including PNSC and SOP) over independent/correlated lognormal shadowing channels and 
composite fading channels. The parameters are set to Pt =1, ωD = ωE = 1, σD = σE = 1, and Cth 
= 0 dB. Simulation is performed by transmitting 1 × 10
6
 bits. The unit for the average secrecy 
capacity is bits/channel use. 
 
A. Numerical results 
In Figs. 2 and 3, we compare simulation and analysis results of the average secrecy capacity 
over independent/correlated lognormal shadowing channels. One can see that our analysis results 
match the simulation results very well. This shows the accuracy of the approximation. It can be 
observed that the average secrecy capacity over independent lognormal fading channel for a 
higher μγE outperforms that for a lower μγE. A higher μγE represents a better secure channel 
condition for the S–D communication pair, because the channel capacity difference between the 
main and eavesdropper channels increases with μγE for a given μγD/μγE. Moreover, we also note 
that the average secrecy capacity over a correlated lognormal fading channel for a lower ρ 
outperforms that for a higher ρ due to a higher ρ representing a stronger correlation between the 
main and eavesdropper channels. 
Similar observations can be also made from Figs. 4–7 for the PNSC and SOP over 
independent/correlated lognormal fading channels. More specifically, we can observe that ρ has 
an opposite influence on the PNSC and SOP over a correlated lognormal fading channel on both 
sides of the cutoff (−0.5 and 0.5 dB in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively). As shown in Figs. 4 and 5, the 
PNSC over independent/correlated lognormal fading channels has a cutoff (0 dB). Furthermore, 
as shown in Figs. 6 and 7, the SOP over independent and correlated lognormal fading channels 
has a cutoff of −0.3 and 0.7 dB, respectively. 
On the other hand, in Figs. 4 and 5, we can find that simulation and analysis results do not 
match well for PNSC in low μγD/μγE for lower μγE. This difference mainly arises from the 
approximation method adopted to deal with the integral of the function of lognormal variables in 
(4). 
As shown in Fig. 5, we can also see that the PNSC with a higher ρ outperforms that with a 
lower ρ while μγD/μγE is positive. A similar conclusion can be made for the SOP when μγD/μγE 
is larger than 0.7 dB, as shown in Fig. 7. 
Moreover, we can also observe that all PNSC curves converge to the same horizontal 
asymptote (SOP = 1) while μγD/μγE increases. As presented in Figs. 6 and 7, it is obvious that all 
SOP curves go very smoothly when μγD/μγE is not larger than −0.3 and 0.7 dB, respectively. 
In Figs. 8–10, we present the results for composite fading channels. It can be observed that 
analysis results match the simulation results very well. A higher μγE outperforms a lower μγE. A 
higher μγE represents a better secure channel condition for the main link (S–D), since the channel 
capacity difference between the main and eavesdropper channels increases with μγE given a fixed 
μγD/μγE.Moreover, there is a cutoff of −1.2, 0, and −1 dB, in Figs. 8–10, respectively. 
Figs. 11–13 present simulation results to compare the average secrecy capacity, PNSC, and 
SOP over independent/correlated lognormal and composite fading channels, when ρ = 0.4 and 
μγE = 2 and 5. In these figures, we can see that average secrecy capacity, PNSC, and SOP have a 
cutoff of 0 dB. 
In Fig. 11, it is obvious that the average secrecy capacity over composite fading channels 
outperforms those over the two other fading channels when μγD/μγE is negative. The average 
secrecy capacities over the three considered fading channels are similar when μγD/μγE is positive. 
In Fig. 12, we can observe that the PNSC over composite fading channels outperforms those 
over the two other fading channels when μγD/μγE is negative, and the PNSC over correlated 
lognormal fading channels outperforms those over the other two fading channels when μγD/μγE is 
positive. 
In Fig. 13, the SOP over correlated lognormal fading channels outperforms those over the other 
two fading channels when μγD/μγE is positive. 
 
B. Computation Time and Accuracy Analysis 
In the following, the computation time and the accuracy analysis of our proposed analytical 
expressions are discussed for the considered system over independent/correlated lognormal fading 
channels and composite fading channels. 
As observed from Table I, benefiting from the adopted approximations, our analytical 
expressions save much time compared with simulations. Thus, we can conclude that our proposed 
analytical models are suitable for practical application due to its low computational complexity. 
To facilitate the accuracy analysis, in the following, we denote θ = μγD/μγE. We present a 
useful measure to illustrate the accuracy of our proposed analytical models as 
 
error = (simulation results − analytical results) /simulation results × 100%. 
 
As shown in Tables II–X, we can see that the discrepancies between the analytical and 
simulation results are quite small in most cases. In Tables II and V, the computational errors in 
Figs. 2 and 5 are large, as mentioned earlier, but within ±35% in the low-μγD/μγE region. 
However, low μγD/μγE represents the cases when the S–D link is much worse than the S–E link 
(that is to say, E locates very close to S), which are quite rare in practical scenarios. 
Thus, we can conclude that our proposed analytical models can work well in most practical 
cases with low computational complexity and error. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the average secrecy capacity and secrecy outage (including 
PNSC and SOP) of secure communications over independent/correlated lognormal fading 
channels and composite fading channels. The approximate closed-form expressions for these 
performance indexes have been derived, whose accuracies have been verified by simulation 
results. 
The parameters chosen in Section 5 are from practical scenarios [41], [42]. Thus, our results are 
at least useful for these applications, although the accuracy may decrease for other applications. 
There are considerable errors between simulation and analysis results in Figs. 2 and 5, but they 
only occur in the lower μγD/μγE region, when the S–D link is much worse than the S–E link (that 
is, E locates very close to S and is rare in practical applications). Moreover, most of the errors are 
on the order of 10−3 or 10−4, which are acceptable in practical applications. 
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